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The effects of mixed membership in a deliberative forum: 
the Irish Constitutional Convention of 2012-14 
 
 
The use of deliberative mini-publics is proliferating, though for the most part they 
have tended to operate at the local or municipal level, leading to questions over 
whether deliberation can ever be ‘scaled up’ (Dryzek 2010; Niemeyer 2011; 
Bächtiger and Wegman 2014). The early real-world examples of deliberation on a 
larger scale – the citizens’ assemblies of British Columbia, Ontario and the 
Netherlands – proved unsuccessful in terms of policy outcomes (Fournier et al. 2011). 
It is suggested that one major reason for this was a disconnect between the citizen 
members and the wider political class who were excluded from the deliberative 
process and who therefore neither paid much heed to it nor supported its outcomes.   
 
The post-2008 Great Recession and its political fallout triggered a new round of 
debates over the potential of deliberation in processes of constitutional reform: the 
argument that was made was that this could help to bridge a perceived gap between 
citizens and politics and to initiate a process of democratic renewal (Contiades and 
Fotiadou 2017; Reuchamps and Suiter 2016). New initiatives (some government 
sponsored others privately organized) have been popping up as far afield as Australia, 
Belgium, Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and 
in parts of the US. These new initiatives provide fresh opportunities to test the merits 
of deliberative approaches.   
 
This paper focuses on the Irish case. The Irish Constitutional Convention of 2012-14 
(www.constitutionalconvention.ie) was a mixed-member deliberative forum, 
including lay citizens and members of parliament as members – a version of the 
‘directly representative democracy’ advocated by Michael Neblo and his colleagues 
(2018). Established by the Irish government in the midst of the worst economic crisis 
in the country’s history the Convention was tasked with reviewing a number of areas 
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of constitutional reform. While the Constitutional Convention was not without its 
critics (Carolan 2015), most academic commentary on it has been positive (e.g. 
Flinders et al. 2016; Honohan 2014; Suteu 2015; Van Reybrouck 2016; White 2017). 
And with some reason: it was successful as a deliberative process (Suiter et al. 2016); 
a large portion of its recommendations have been or will be implemented (Arnold et 
al. 2019; Farrell 2018) – including, most dramatically, a successful referendum on the 
hot topic of marriage equality in 2015 (Elkink et al. 2017); and the political elite 
clearly judged it successful as seen by the decision of a new Irish government (elected 
in 2016) to establish a fresh citizens’ assembly (www.citizensassembly.ie) which 
operated between 2016-18.1   
 
It is felt generally that a factor behind the success of the 2012-14 Irish Constitutional 
Convention was its mixed membership, 66 randomly selected citizens working side-
by-side with 33 professional politicians, with the latter anchoring the process in the 
political system, making it more likely that the convention’s recommendations would 
receive a fair hearing. It is this mix of two types of members that is the focus of this 
paper, which speaks to a debate in the academic literature on membership in mini-
publics (e.g. Smith 2009; Smith and Stephenson 2005; Vandamme et al. 2019; White 
2017). Our objective is to assess how the inclusion of politicians as members may 
have impacted on the operation of the Convention (i.e. how it worked) and/or its 
outcomes. In one sense at least (as we discuss below) the inclusion of politician 
members may have helped in grounding the process, thus enabling the Convention’s 
recommendations to have a fair hearing in wider political and governmental circles. 
The question at the heart of this paper is whether this may have been at a cost to the 
deliberative process that underlay the mini-public design of the Convention.  
 
We make use of data gathered during and after the operation of the Convention to 
examine whether the mixed-membership deliberative forum was as successful as it 
may have appeared. We find little impact in terms of the operation of the Convention 
                                                        
1 This Irish citizens’ assembly was tasked with considering a range of issues including 
Ireland’s constitutional ban on abortion. The 100-member assembly was comprised solely of 
citizens (again randomly selected): the lack of politician members on this occasion was most 
likely due to the politically toxic nature of the abortion debate in Ireland. The assembly’s 
recommendation to remove Ireland’s constitutional ban on abortion went to a referendum, 
which passed in May 2018. 
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(for instance, no evidence that politicians dominated the discussions). There is 
evidence of a slight liberal bias among the politician membership, but its impact on 
the outcomes of the Convention appears to have been quite limited – though the 
politician members do appear to have had some effect on the Convention’s position 
on the question of electoral reform. 
 
The paper is organized in four sections. We start, in section 1 with background on the 
origins and operation of the Irish Constitutional Convention and how it was situated 
as a mixed-membership mini-public compared to earlier cases of citizen-only 
assemblies. Section 2 sets out our three hypotheses that are then tested, in turn, in 
sections 3, 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
1. The Irish Constitutional Convention 
The Convention was established in late 2012 by the Irish government to review eight 
areas for possible constitutional reform (for more details, see Arnold et al. 2019; 
Farrell et al. 2017). Chaired by a well-respected former charity chief, Tom Arnold, its 
other 99 members was a mix of 66 Irish citizens and 33 politicians. The citizen 
members were selected at random by an independent market research company, 
which had a brief of ensuring that the membership was a reasonable reflection of the 
population in terms of sex, age, region, education and socio-economic status – a tall 
order with just 66 individuals but one that was broadly achieved (Suiter et al. 2016). 
The political parties themselves determined how their members were selected: for 
example, Fine Gael asked for volunteers and the party whip selected the nominees, 
whereas the Labour Parliamentary Party voted on their nominees. All major political 
parties on the island of Ireland as well a grouping of Independent parliamentarians 
were invited to send members to the Convention.2  
 
The Irish Constitutional Convention was not the first process of its type in the world 
to include a random selection of ordinary citizens as members or to adopt a 
                                                        
2 The members from the Irish parliament were proportionate to the number of seats in the 
parliament. Of the 33 politician members, 29 were members of the Irish parliament (from 
either house), four were members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, only one of whom 
completed the surveys referred to in this paper.  In the analysis that follows we deal only with 
the Irish parliament members. 
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deliberative approach. It followed – and in very large part was closely modeled on – 
the citizens’ assemblies of British Columbia, Ontario and the Netherlands that 
occurred earlier in the millennium. Between them these cases are indicative of a new 
form of constitutional convention, arguably the like of which has not been seen before 
(Farrell 2014). As Wheatley and Mendez’s comprehensive study (2013) shows, the 
constitutional convention models of the past have tended to comprise one of three 
forms of membership: representatives of the elite, representatives of sectoral interests, 
or – as in the case of the Icelandic Constitutional Council – elected citizens.  The 
Canadian, Dutch and Irish cases are marked out as different from these other cases by 
having citizens selected randomly from the wider population, and also by the manner 
in which they operated – in effect as mini-publics: i.e. deliberative fora rather than the 
more common method of parliamentary-style style posturing from pre-existing fixed 
positions. 
 
The Convention may have been modeled on the Canadian and Dutch citizens’ 
assemblies, but it differed from them in two important respects. The first difference 
related to the Convention’s agenda, notably its breadth (and directly as a 
consequence, the lack of depth in treatment). The citizens’ assemblies each dealt with 
just one issue (the electoral system) over an extended period of months, whereas the 
Irish Constitutional Convention had to deal with eight topics in eight meetings.  The 
topic list set by the governments was as follows: marriage equality, blasphemy, the 
role of women in the home and public life, women in politics, the electoral system, 
the voting age, votes for non-Irish residents in presidential elections, and the length of 
the Irish president’s term of office. Once it had completed this brief the Convention 
was given limited space to consider other topics. After a series of national road shows 
and seeking submissions on line, the members opted to consider two more topics in its 
final sessions: parliamentary reform, and economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
The second main difference between the Convention and the citizens’ assemblies – 
and of particular relevance to this paper – was the inclusion of politicians as 
members: in White’s terms this made it a ‘citizen-majority’ Convention (2017: 329). 
The Canadian and Dutch citizens’ assemblies followed the principle that politicians 
should be excluded from the process. As ‘citizen-only’ assemblies (White 2017: 329) 
there were, by definition, no politician members (they were screened out in the 
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randomized process of recruiting members); indeed, further than White’s definition of 
the genre, politicians were not even invited to address the assembly. This was 
designed to ensure that the process was independent of party politics and that there 
would be no dilution of its deliberative element.  
 
But this was not without drawbacks. Questions were raised over the degree of realism 
in some of the output of the assemblies. As Ratner observes of the British Columbia 
citizens’ assembly: ‘the exclusion of political voices from [citizens’ assembly] 
deliberations became grounds for criticism of their judgment’ (2008: 163). It also 
provided the political parties with a good excuse not to involve themselves in the 
referendum campaigns that followed in the cases of the British Columbia and Ontario 
citizens’ assemblies. None of the major parties campaigned in the referendums; they 
remained ‘completely silent’ throughout (Fournier et al. 2011: 109), as a consequence 
of which the referendum campaigns had great difficulty in drumming up voter 
interest. In effect, the parties were able to kill off awkward electoral reform proposals 
by simply ignoring them.  Patrick Fournier and his colleagues draw the following 
conclusion from this experience: 
With respect to the political parties, our findings are absolutely unequivocal. 
The parties were strikingly absent from the whole process. This itself raises 
important questions about the consequences of such a situation. The risk, of 
course, is that assembly members may not have fully appreciated the problems 
and opportunities that parties face under different electoral systems (2011: 111). 
 
Arguably the Irish government’s decision to include politician members in the 
Convention reduced this risk of political detachment. But the many critics of the 
proposed Convention thought this was a bad idea. One prominent commentator 
referred to it as ‘one part Oireachtas [parliamentary] committee and two parts focus 
group’.3 In a parliamentary debate opposition politicians raised concerns over how the 
politician members may ‘have an undue bearing on the deliberations’.4 One 
parliamentarian made the following, quite telling, observation: 
                                                        
3 Noel Whelan, ‘Constitutional convention will have its remit severely pruned’, Irish Times, 
February 25, 2012. 
4 Catherine Murphy TD, Dáil debate July 10, 2013. 
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 [B]est international practice does not include elected representatives in 
constitutional conventions. Two of the best recognised speakers in the world on 
this matter are Archon Fung from the Harvard Kennedy School, under whom I 
had the privilege to study, and Ken Carty from the University of British 
Columbia in Canada. In their work in this field, they acknowledge that the 
presence of partisan influence can lead to distorted deliberations and outcomes. 
Professor Fung says that in deliberative democracy ‘powerful participants may 
seek to improperly and unreasonably exclude issues that threaten their interests 
from the scope of deliberation’.5 
 
At the heart of our analysis is the issue of whether ‘powerful participants’ may have 
influenced the operation and outcomes of the Irish Constitutional Convention.  This 
speaks to wider debates in the academic literature over the membership of mini-
publics particularly in instances where regular citizens are being mixed together with 
others, such as those where citizens are working in collaboration with public officials 
(e.g. in participatory budgeting processes, see Santos 1998; another example is the 
Birmingham race-relations collaborations discussed by Smith and Stephenson 2005). 
Much of the focus to date has been on mixing citizens with public officials or citizen 
advocates; there has been relatively less on the mixing of regular citizens with 
politicians. A recent Belgian survey found widespread support for a ‘mixed chamber’ 
that included politicians and regular citizens. While this may be a popular idea with 
Belgian survey respondents, the study’s authors warn of the potential ‘hazard’ of 
‘intellectual domination that sortition MPs [i.e. those randomly selected] might suffer 
when seated among professional politicians (Vandamme et al. 2019: 139). The Irish 
case offers a real-world test of how this might work in practice. 
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
The Irish Constitutional Convention was a national-level deliberative forum 
established by the Irish government which mixed national politicians together with a 
random selection of citizens.  The government proposed that the recommendations of 
the Convention would be debated in the lower house of the Irish parliament (a portion 
of whose members were themselves Convention members), with the possibility of 
                                                        
5 Stephen Donnelly TD, Dáil debate July 10, 2013. 
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constitutional referendums to follow (dependent ultimately on the government’s 
reaction to the proposals).   
 
This mixed design – a variant of Hendriks’ ‘mixed discursive space’ (2006: 500) – 
had the merit of reducing the risks that the political classes might seek to sideline the 
outcomes of the Convention, which – as we have seen – was a weakness of the 
Canadian cases.  This was a step in the direction of better interaction between mini-
publics and legislators called for by Bächtiger and his colleagues in their desire for a 
‘new era of deliberative mini-publics’ (2014: 225).  
 
But there were risks attached to including politicians who were likely to be 
‘interested, passionate, or biased’ (Elster 2012: 16): powerful participants tend to have 
strongly held views, and their participation could exacerbate ‘power asymmetries’ in 
the Convention (Lupia and Norton 2017: 65). At the outset, there was no way of 
knowing how things would operate; it was not inconceivable that the politician 
members – some of whom turned out to be very senior – might seek to establish rules 
of procedure more akin to the parliamentary styles of operation rather than 
deliberative procedures.6  The government resolution establishing the Convention was 
silent on the question of mode of operation, so anything was possible. It was clear that 
in a mixed setting such as this great care needed to be taken in determining the 
institutional design so as to ensure a good balance between the two types of 
participants (Dryzek 2007: 246). 
 
There are ways to mitigate the risks of dominance of one group over another. The 
secretariat of the Convention were clearly cognizant of the need to ensure that it 
followed best practice in operating along deliberative lines including: complimenting 
open plenary sessions with private roundtable discussions; arranging members in 
mixed (politicians and citizens) groups at tables of eight (and rotating the 
memberships of tables from one meeting to the next); and using trained facilitators to 
                                                        
6 This was precisely the situation that occurred is the case of the Australian 1998 
Constitutional Convention – the only other such case (at least in modern times) of a 
convention whose membership comprised a mix of politicians and ordinary citizens (though 
these were not randomly selected). There the decision was taken to operate along normal 
parliamentary lines (for more, see Constitutional Convention 1998; Warhurst 1999; Williams 
1998). 
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ensure that all members had an equal chance to contribute to discussions. In addition, 
there was an important decision on Rules and Procedures made by the Convention’s 
members at the inaugural meeting.7 A notable feature of these rules was an agreement 
to take decisions by secret ballot, in effect preventing any attempt by political parties 
to apply a party whip to their members. Based on these Rules and Procedures, the 
Chairman established a set of principles by which the Convention should operate, 
which he reminded members of on repeated occasions and which were included in his 
introduction to each of the reports. The key mantras were: openness and transparency; 
fairness; ‘equality of voice’ and collegiality (Arnold et al. 2019). 
 
But there are limits to what can be set in place to reduce the risks of dominant groups.  
The issue of politician dominance over a deliberative process featured in a British 
experiment, the 2015 Democracy Matters Citizens’ Assembly 
(www.citizensassembly.co.uk), which sought to test the potential for a constitutional 
mini-public in the British context. Informed by the Canadian and Irish experiences the 
research team designed two city-based mini-public experiments, one involving only 
citizen members (the Canadian model) and the other a mix of citizen and politician 
members (the Irish model). Their evidence from surveying the members is that citizen 
members in the latter group were more inclined to feel that some members dominated 
the discussions: when probed it was clear that for the most part it was politician 
members who were seen to be domineering. The report’s authors conclude: ‘At least 
in the short term, inclusion of politicians decreases the quality of deliberation 
(including the amount of perceived domination)’ (Flinders et al. 2016: 42). This leads 
to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1 The politician members dominated the proceedings of the Irish 
Constitutional Convention. 
 
The Democracy Matters research team speculate over whether there might have been 
a longer-term impact from this politician domination in terms of shaping ‘the agenda 
                                                        
7 The rules of procedure are included in each of the reports of the Convention. For an example 
see appendix B of its first report at 
http://www.constitutionalconvention.ie/AttachmentDownload.ashx?mid=e1f8e128-2496-
e211-a5a0-005056a32ee4  
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of the discussions and judgements that follow’ (ibid.).  While an interesting 
speculation they were unable to test this because their experiment occurred over just 
two weekends. We can envisage how this longer-term impact might occur in one of 
two ways.  First, there is the issue about which politicians might seek to become 
members of the Convention.  As mentioned above, there was a strong element of self-
selection involved.  It is possible to envisage an agenda by a dogged group of 
politicians seeking to influence the Convention by becoming members and working 
from the inside, in effect following a politics of ‘entryism’. Conceivably these could 
have been politicians of any hue – for instance conservative politicians seeking to 
temper the outcomes of the Convention, or on the contrary, liberal politicians seeking 
to steer its outcomes in a more radical direction.  Unlike the previous hypothesis 
which focused on how the politician members operated during the proceedings, in this 
instance the focus is on the ideological makeup of the politician members. Thus, our 
second hypothesis: 
 
H2 The lack of random selection in the recruitment of politician members 
left the Constitutional Convention vulnerable to the entry of politicians 
with an ideological bias. 
 
Separate from whether the politician members were ideologically biased, an 
alternative take is to examine whether their inclusion in some way influenced the 
outcomes of the Convention. This echoes a concern raised by Smith over how the 
‘attractiveness of collaboration’ between politician and lay members ‘can mask severe 
imbalances of power’ (2009: 172). As Bächtiger and Parkinson suggest: ‘[s]ometimes 
critical distance is required in order to … provide a space to develop particular 
practices and understandings away from the domination of the powerful’ (2017: ch. 
6). There is a risk that a mixed membership deliberative forum could result in a 
distortion of outcomes because the inclusion of the dominant group ‘makes for an 
outcome they feel more able to support’ (White 2017: 329). This leads to our final 
hypothesis: 
 
H3 The inclusion of politician members distorted the outcomes of the Irish 
Constitutional Convention. 
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3. Did the politician members dominate the debate?  
To test our first hypothesis, we have three sources of information: interviews with 
some of the citizen members towards the end of the Convention’s work; surveys of 
the members that occurred throughout the process; and data gathered from the 
roundtable discussions. To set this in context, it is important to remember that the 
modus operandi of the Convention consisted of a mix of plenary presentations and 
discussions that were public and private roundtable discussions in which each table 
(generally of seven or eight members) was led by a trained facilitator with a note-
taker keeping a record of the discussions and the outcome of the deliberations on the 
given topic (Farrell et al. 2017).  Anyone observing the public sessions could see that 
generally the politician members tended to be first to the microphone to express a 
view or ask a question.8 In that sense in might be said that they dominated the public 
proceedings. But the question of interest is whether they were also dominant during 
the roundtable discussions when the small-group deliberation occurred. 
 
In a series of semi-structured interviews with nine of the citizen members that were 
carried out in the final days of the Convention, the question was posed whether the 
politicians dominated the roundtable discussions.9 For the most part, the citizen 
members were of the view that the politician members did not seek to dominate. As 
one citizen member (male) put it quite bluntly: ‘[The politician members] never tried 
to take over the table. They’d say what they had to say, and then they’d shut up’. 
Another concurs: ‘At the roundtables, I thought everyone was pretty much equal most 
of the time’. There were some exceptions: some of the interviewees refer to individual 
politician members on occasions being more dominant; there is a sense that 
politicians tended to be more prominent when technical issues were being discussed, 
such as electoral or parliamentary reform (both issues that politicians could be 
expected to have strong views on); and there are occasional references to ‘subtle 
ways’ of seeking to influence things, such as giving guidance to the note-taker on the 
summary of the discussion.  But these appeared to be minority instances of politicians 
trying to dominate the roundtable deliberations. For the most part, the views of the 
citizen members about the role of the politician members were very positive. 
                                                        
8 The video streams of the public sessions are available here: 
https://www.youtube.com/user/ConstitutionIe  
9 The semi-structured interviews took place in February 2014. 
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We have survey evidence to support this – a similar question to that asked in the 
British Democracy Matters experiment.  For eight of the meetings of the Convention 
(which each occurred over a weekend) we surveyed the members at the start of each 
meeting (on the Saturday morning) and towards the end (late on the Sunday morning).  
These surveys attracted a response rate of between 57-75 per cent.  In the second 
weekend survey we asked the members whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
statement that ‘Some participants tended to dominate the discussion’.  
 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Breaking down the 403 responses between the citizens and politicians, a marginally 
larger number of citizens (14 per cent as against 9 per cent) believed that some 
participants tended to dominate (see Table 1). However, a marginally larger number 
of citizens also disagreed that some participants dominated the discussion. Table 2 
reports the trends week by week, showing slightly higher tendencies for members to 
think there was some domination in weeks 4, 5 and 8, which happened to be when the 
Convention discussed rather technical matters that had most resonance for the 
politician members: the electoral system in weeks 4 and 5 and parliamentary reform 
in week 8. This tallies with some of the comments of our citizen interviewees. 
Overall, however, these numbers and the differences are too small to expect that they 
might have an appreciable impact on the results overall.  In a regression analysis of 
this (not reported here) that includes the week number and other demographic 
characteristics of the participants (age and sex), we find that the difference between 
politicians and citizens is not statistically significant.   
 
One final piece of evidence is provided by the table note-takers who were asked to 
record (by a simple tick) the regularity of contributions by members at their table.  
These ‘speech acts’ ranged from short expressions of agreement or disagreement 
through to long explanations of a viewpoint.  Across our eight weekends there was a 
grand total of 560 speech acts made by citizen members at the roundtables and 356 by 
politician members. When we control for the relative sizes of the membership (two-
thirds citizens and one-third politicians) this shows that on a per capita basis across all 
the weekends the citizen members spoke 61 per cent of the time, and politician 
 12 
members 39 per cent of the time.  What we take from this is that on average the 
politician members spoke slightly more than the citizen members – but only slightly. 
 
In short, there is no support for H1: contrary to the findings in the British Democracy 
Matters experiment, in the Irish Constitutional Convention there is no evidence of 
politicians dominating the deliberative process. The different findings could have 
something to do with the scope of the endeavour: in the British experiment the 
report’s authors speculate that their trends may have been different ‘if more high 
profile politicians participated’ (Flinders et al. 2016: 42). Indeed, the evidence from 
on-line deliberative experiments with US Congressmen carried out by Michael Neblo 
and his colleagues (2018), which also found high levels of citizen satisfaction with the 
process, lends support to the notion that the profile of the politicians is a factor. 
 
The different results between the UK and Irish cases may also reflect the fact that the 
Irish Constitutional Convention occurred over a far longer period than the British 
experiment, thus allowing time for the two groups to become accustomed to working 
together, becoming more familiar with each other (Esterling et al. 2015). An 
illustration of this is provided in the following quote by one of the politician members 
in a subsequent parliamentary debate on one of the Convention’s reports: 
Thinking back to our first meeting in Dublin Castle, there was a bit of an ‘us 
and them’ scenario, with ‘us and them’ being citizens and politicians. I can 
remember one particular citizen standing up and asking attendees not to let the 
politicians do all the talking. I thought, ‘Oh God, here we go, this is going to be 
a disaster of nine months if this is the attitude’, but the ice was broken in Dublin 
Castle that day. Anyone who is a regular attendee of the convention at the 
weekends has seen that friendships have developed at each and every table 
across all parties, sexes and ages.10 
 
This view is echoed by an interview with one of the citizen members who, when 
asked what she thought of the inclusion of politicians as members, commented: ‘I was 
actually initially opposed to the politicians being in the Convention at all, but it’s 
actually been really helpful’. The sense that including politicians was helpful was 
                                                        
10 John Lyons TD, Dáil debates, July 18 2013. 
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shared by most of the interviewees: the common explanation for this was that they 
were useful sounding boards – to a degree perhaps helping to inject a sense of realism 
to some of the discussions. 
 
4. Entryism? 
Given that for the most part the politician members self-selected as members, and that 
the agenda of the Convention was well-known in advance, it is possible that there 
may have been an intent on the part of the politician members at the outset to 
influence the work of the Convention by becoming members and working from the 
inside, in effect following a politics of entryism. In order to assess this we need to 
determine whether the politicians who attended the Constitutional Convention were of 
a distinctly different ideological hue to their peers.  
 
To do so we make use of the 2011 Irish candidate survey, carried out in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2011 general election and only a short period before the 
establishment of the Constitutional Convention.11 This survey gives us a comparable 
insight between politician members and non-members of the Convention. We can 
compare the responses of 16 members and alternates of the Convention and 69 other 
elected representatives (of either house of parliament) that were not members of the 
Convention but were potentially otherwise eligible.  
 
Using factor analysis (varimax rotation) we simplify the political positions of each 
respondent from 19 attitudinal questions down to a single univariate conservative-
liberal dimension.  The factor analysis reported in Table 3 quite cleanly separates 
respondents in terms of a classic left-right divide characterized by economic, religious 
and stability versus change aspects. Those with a higher score are more likely to 
favour stability and right-wing views, whereas those with a lower score are more 
likely to adopt a greater tolerance for change. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
                                                        
11 We are grateful to Gail McElroy for having given us access to these survey data. 
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The factor analysis produces a consistent basis for evaluating each politician in terms 
of a numerical value understanding their left-right position. When we average these 
positions across candidates of each political party we observe in Table 4 a familiar 
left right pattern with those hailing from political parties more typically viewed as 
being right wing adopting higher scores while those hailing from typically more left 
wing parties adopting lower scores (for more on Irish party locations on the left-right 
spectrum, see Marsh and McElroy 2016).  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
To evaluate whether those who took part in the Convention were more or less 
conservative we must calculate the average score for politicians in different categories 
in the Convention. While there are many different types of politicians the key 
comparison is whether those who participated in the Convention were ideologically 
distinct from those who did not.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
As Table 5 shows, politician members of the Convention had an average score of 4.23 
compared with non-members who had an average score of 5.03. This indicates that 
those who took part were more liberal than those who did not. And when compared 
with those parliamentary candidates who were not elected in 2011, who have an 
average of 4.41, the politician members were again more liberal. When we look at a 
two-sample t-test to evaluate whether ‘Members of CC’ are significantly more liberal 
than ‘Elected Reps not including any CC members’ we get a p-value of 0.25. This 
falls to 0.22 for the comparison between ‘Member or Alternate of CC’ and ‘Elected 
Reps not including members of the CC’.  
 
This comparison between members and non-members needs to take account of the 
fact that many politician members attended only a limited number of sessions and 
were replaced by other politicians as alternates.12 Some alternatives attended many 
                                                        
12 Members (citizen and politician) could be substituted in the event that they could not make 
a session. As we discuss below, this option was taken up more regularly by the politician 
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sessions whereas some attended very few. To evaluate whether those who were there 
were ideologically distinct from those who were not there we look into attendance 
records at the Convention and compare the average scores of those attending as 
against those that did not attend (including politicians that were members of the 
Convention, but for whatever reason could not quite make it on a given weekend). 
Our analysis (not reported here) reveals there is a bigger gap between attendees and 
non-attendees than is the case when we just looked at the politician members as a 
totality. It would appear that the process of substituting politicians had the effect of 
creating a Convention that was even more liberal than one where no substitutions 
were allowed.  The difference is somewhat significant with a p-value of 0.058. In 
other words, we are 94 per cent sure that politician Convention attendees were more 
liberal than politician Convention members overall. Overall, therefore, this analysis 
suggests that the politician members of the Convention were marginally more liberal 
than other politicians in the Irish parliament, thus supporting H2. 
 
5. Did the politician members distort the outcomes? 
A final question to consider is whether the politician members had a distorting effect 
on the outcomes of the Convention. Evidence that politician members were 
significantly different from the lay citizens in their views on the topics being 
considered would lend support to our third hypothesis. 
 
The weekend surveys referred to in section 3 also measured opinion shifts. We know 
from the wider body of literature on deliberation that one measure (albeit somewhat 
contested) of the ‘success’ of a deliberative process is the degree of opinion shifts 
among the participants (Fishkin 2009; Suiter et al. 2016a).13 The weekend surveys 
allow us to analyze whether the politician or citizen members changed their positions 
on the specific matter being discussed in a given weekend.   
 
                                                        
members; indeed, in the case of independent members of parliament, there was an agreed rota 
among them.  
13 We might question whether preference transformation is in fact central to deliberative democracy. 
Certainly deliberation should allow the possibility of change as the ‘good’ deliberative citizen will be 
open minded, but the realisation of policy change is not necessary; for instance, it is quite possible for 
deliberation to strengthen the existing stances held by certain participants (Bächtiger and Gerber 2013), 
or to have little impact on opinion change (Baccaro et al. 2016). 
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[Table 6 about here] 
 
We first look at whether members in general were influenced by the weekend of 
deliberation. Table 6 looks in the aggregate at whether respondents were in favour of 
a change prior to the debates (i.e. at the start of the weekend) and then after the 
debates (at the end of the weekend). The data clearly indicate that significant numbers 
of those who were opposed to a constitutional change did in fact change their views. 
Across all topics among those who were opposed to an initiative prior to the meeting 
30 per cent changed their mind to be in favour of that initiative once the meeting had 
concluded.   
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
When we break this down by issue (Table 7) it is clear that on some issues such as the 
electoral system there is some minor movement towards the opposing viewpoint (with 
25 per cent of those in favour moving to oppose while 18 per cent of those opposing 
moved in the opposite direction), whereas in the case of marriage equality, women in 
the home, women in politics, and votes abroad there is significant movement towards 
being in favour.  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
As a starting point (the positions before the weekend meeting) citizens and politicians 
had broadly similar but marginally different starting points. Table 8 shows these 
starting positions. In the case of the electoral system the politicians were more likely 
to be against, whereas in relation to most other issues they were more likely to be in 
favour of change, in particular on marriage equality, emigrant vote, and voting age. 
This initial analysis suggests, therefore, that, consistent with their more liberal views, 
in large part the politician members tended to be on the side favouring change, the 
notable exception being the issue of electoral reform, which most Irish politicians are 
opposed to (Farrell et al. 2017a). In most other respects our descriptive analysis places 
the politicians on the side favouring change more so than the citizens, thus lending 
support to our third hypothesis. 
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We carried out a regression analysis using these weekend surveys to see if there were 
any significant effects while accounting for other factors: the results were not 
significant and are therefore not reported here.14 However, we have one other set of 
data we can bring to bear on this analysis. All the members of the Convention were 
surveyed just after it had completed its business.15 The respondents were asked 
whether they were in favour of the constitutional changes being considered. Table 9 
reports on a regression analysis that includes details of membership type (politician 
vs. citizen), age, sex, and details of the constitutional changes in question. The 
regression in Table 9 looks at the likelihood that a member of the Convention 
expresses a preference in favour of constitutional change. It seeks to explain whether 
politician or citizen members are more or less likely to favour a change, while also 
accounting for other factors.  
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
We observe in Model 1 that, again, politicians were more likely to favour a change 
than citizens. The relationship is ‘somewhat significant’, with a P-value of 0.070. In  
Model 2, once we account for demographics and the type of constitutional change 
being considered it is clear that politicians are significantly more likely to favour 
change. In Model 3 we interact the politician variable with each question to 
understand the ways in which politicians tend to deviate from citizens. Although the 
politician variable is no longer statistically significant in the third model, the loss of 
significance is the result of its interaction with the other variables. While in the 
normal scheme of things the politician members were more likely to be in favour of 
change, this does appear to vary slightly according to which constitutional change is 
in question. The interaction term politician*electoral system is negative and 
somewhat statistically significant. This means that in relation to electoral systems the 
                                                        
14 The results are available from the authors. 
15 While there were 29 Irish parliament members, inevitably the actual number who 
participated was greater due to the need for members to be substituted when not available. 
Throughout the lifetime of the Convention there were a total of 52 members from the Irish 
parliament who attended its meetings, 31 of whom responded to the survey – a response rate 
of 59.6 per cent. The response rate of the citizen members was also strong: 49 responded out 
of a total pool of 75 members (i.e. just under two-thirds of the total). 
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politicians were somewhat more reluctant than on the other issues (as also shown in 
Table 8).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The relationship between the type of member and the topic being considered is a 
complex one, as illustrated by the marginal effects plot in Figure 1 constructed from 
the regression model in Table 9. It shows that while politicians were more reluctant in 
relation to electoral reform there was (by this point) a strong degree of overlap with 
the citizens. Citizens were comparatively less supportive of change in relation to 
blasphemy, same-sex marriage, women in the home, women’s participation in 
politics, emigrant voting rights, and most of all in relation to the voting age.  
These results point to important differences between citizens and politicians that 
relate to power interests. The two issues that citizens were more reluctant on were 
those that would result in widening the franchise to younger voters and to emigrants – 
both reforms that by broadening the pool of voters would dilute the voting power of 
existing voters. On the other hand, politicians were comparably more reticent about 
changes in the electoral system and changes to the length of the presidential term. 
Changes to the electoral system pose a direct threat to existing politicians, while more 
frequent presidential elections are perhaps another area which (albeit marginally) 
increases the relative power of citizens. In relation to socio-moral issues the views of 
politicians and citizens were more consistent.  
 
Overall, the regression analysis provides some support for H3: on an issue that – 
following the ‘turkeys not voting for Christmas’ adage – could be said to matter to 
politicians, opinion shifted from favouring electoral reform to opposing it, in other 
words to the position favoured most of all by the politician members. It is noteworthy 
that on the other topics, and notably those in which the liberal bias of the politician 
members might have been expected to have affected matters, evidence of influence by 
politician members was not conclusive. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 19 
The work of the Irish Constitutional Convention is still reverberating through the Irish 
political system. Its policy legacy is evident in a number of respects: quite a few of its 
recommendations have been implemented, notably on marriage equality, blasphemy 
and parliamentary reform, and referendums on other recommendations (role of 
women, voting age, and votes for citizens abroad) are promised in the near future 
(Farrell 2018). When compared with mini-publics elsewhere (Setälä 2017; Böker and 
Elstub 2015), the Convention has had a significant impact on the policy and 
constitutional landscape. Its substantial political legacy was shown by the creation of 
a new Irish Citizens’ Assembly in late 2016 (Farrell et al. 2018), with every 
likelihood of other Irish citizens’ assemblies to follow.    
 
The Convention has also had an important institutional legacy and that is its status as 
the world’s first national deliberative forum to mix politician and lay citizen 
members.  The purpose of this paper has been to assess whether this worked as a 
model, providing an important real-world test of how mixing memberships in this 
way works in practice. The academic literature cited earlier raised concerns over the 
risk of ‘intellectual domination’ (Vandamme et al. 2019: 139), or of  
‘imbalances of power’ (Smith 2009: 172). On the whole, this was not apparent in the 
Irish case. Certainly, there was no indication that the presence of politician members 
resulted in a sense of domination of some members over others. But in some other 
respects, the inclusion of politician members may have had a distinct (and potentially 
detrimental) impact on the process of deliberation. When compared with the average 
ideological positioning of Irish politicians there was a modest liberal bias among 
those politicians who chose to become members of the Convention. And while this 
does not appear to have influenced the outcome of its decisions (in the sense that there 
is no conclusive evidence of this affecting the outcomes of the Convention on those 
topics, such as marriage equality or the role of women, over which there could be 
expected to be a strong liberal vs. conservative divide), in one respect at least the 
presence of politician members does appear to have affected the outcome – on the 
issue of electoral reform, a matter of considerable personal interest to politicians. 
 
The implications are clear. To avoid the risk of ‘entryism’ by politicians of a certain 
ideological hue, in any future mixed-member deliberative forum politician members 
should be selected randomly in the same manner as the lay citizen members.  And 
 20 
care should be taken to avoid topics (such as electoral reform) where politicians may 
have a vested interest. 
 
Though not a focus of this paper, we should note that an additional weakness was the 
decision to have the Convention consider a range of different topics over a long 
period of time (14 months). The fact that the Convention’s members were so 
supportive of change across the board (reflected in our survey data and also in the 
recommendations) suggests that through the process the members may have 
developed a degree of ‘we’ thinking, reaching shared goals and outcomes. This 
speaks to the need to keep such processes shorter in length. 
 
There is a more fundamental problem with the Irish process and that refers to the 
wider point made by Archon Fung that lay at the heart of the criticism by Stephen 
Donnelly TD (quoted above) of how powerful forces may ‘exclude issues that 
threaten their interests’. This relates to the role of the Irish government in setting the 
Convention’s agenda and reacting to its outcomes. With the exception of two topics 
that the Convention members were allowed to add to their agenda – which resulted in 
discussions on parliamentary reform and a proposal to incorporate economic, social 
and cultural rights into the constitution – all other agenda items were set by 
government.  And the government was free to decide how to react to the Convention’s 
recommendations: it accepted many of them, but there were some notable exceptions 
(including rejection of the proposals on economic, social and cultural rights).  
 
This Irish case of mixing politicians and lay members in a deliberative forum may 
have gone someway to reducing the risk of political detachment (that was so apparent 
in the Canadian cases) and allaying the fears of some that the politicians might 
dominate proceedings, but it did little to address the wider problem (shared generally 
by mini-publics) that, in terms of agenda control at least, this ultimately remained a 
top-down process firmly in the hands of the political elite. 
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Table 1: Responses to the question of whether some members dominated 
discussions 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Sample 
Size 
Citizens 5% 9% 16% 14% 57% 310 
Politicians 3% 6% 26% 14% 51% 93 
Total 4% 8% 18% 14% 56% 403 
 
 
Table 2: Weekly comparisons of the domination question 
  
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree:Agree 
Week 1 3% 9% 28% 21% 40% 85% 
Week 3 3% 6% 18% 15% 59% 90% 
Week 4 6% 9% 19% 13% 53% 81% 
Week 5 6% 10% 10% 10% 65% 83% 
Week 6 2% 4% 21% 9% 64% 92% 
Week 7 3% 8% 16% 15% 57% 86% 
Week 8 8% 12% 15% 10% 54% 75% 
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Table 3: Factor Loadings and corresponding attitudinal questions from factor 
analysis 
 
 
Table 4: Average score of politicians hailing from each political party 
Party Average Loading 
across candidates 
Fianna Fáil 8.83 
Fine Gael 8.17 
Independent 4.73 
Green 3.96 
Labour 1.96 
Sinn Féin - 4.43 
Worker’s Party - 5.51 
United Left Alliance - 9.69 
 
 
Table 5: Mean values, sample sizes and standard deviations of different types of 
politician’s conservative-liberal score 
Type of politician Average 
Loading 
Sample 
Size 
Standard 
Deviation 
1. Alternate of CC -1.24 3 4.98 
2. Member or Alternate of CC 3.21 16 6.24 
3. Member of CC 4.23 13 6.19 
4. Losing Candidates (including some CC members) 4.41 183 5.66 
5. Non-members of CC 4.61 240 5.61 
6. Winning Candidates (including some CC members) 4.80 73 5.64 
7. Elected Reps (not including any CC members) 5.03 69 5.48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statement Loading
Less  Regulation of Bus iness 0.519
Less  State Ownership of Bus iness 0.510
There is  nothing wrong with some people being a  lot richer than others 0.491
God Does  Exis t 0.466
Economy over Environment 0.407
We are a l l  to blame for the economic problems in Ireland as  we a l l  got too greedy 0.397
There should be very s trict l imits  on the number of immigrants  coming to l ive in i reland 0.368
More European Integration 0.358
It would be better i f people with s trong rel igious  bel iefs  held publ ic office 0.264
I would be wi l l ing to accept a  cut in my lower s tandard of l iving to protect the environment -0.135
A working mother can establ ish just as  warm and secure a  relationship with her chi ldren as  a  mother who stays  at home -0.139
The Bri tish government should declare i ts  intention to withdraw from Northern Ireland at a  fixed date in the future -0.147
In genera l  things  would improve i f there were more women in pol i tics -0.173
The people need a  NAMA for their own property and mortgage debts  just as  much as  the banks  do -0.263
A new government should be able to get much better terms on the loan from the IMF/EU -0.300
Raise Taxes  rather than cut spending -0.306
Ordinary working people should get their fa i r share of the nations  wealth -0.423
We should' burn the bondholders ', that i s  we should default on debt in the banks  rather than take on more debt for the country -0.471
The government was  wrong to accept a  ba i lout from the IMF/EU -0.508
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Table 6: Change in opinion before and after debates 
  Post-Debate  
  
Opposed 
In 
Favour 
Sample 
Size 
Pre-
Debate 
Opposed 70% 30% 73 
In 
Favour 
6% 94% 261 
 
 
Table 7: Change in opinion by question 
  Pre-Debate Oppose   
Pre-Debate In 
Favour   
Question Oppose In Favour n Oppose 
In 
Favour n 
Blasphemy 89% 11% 9 12% 88% 34 
Electoral system 82% 18% 11 25% 75% 20 
Women in the home 0% 100% 4 0% 100% 51 
Marriage equality 36% 64% 11 5% 95% 40 
Voting age 88% 13% 24 6% 94% 31 
Emigrant vote 67% 33% 9 6% 94% 36 
Women in politics 60% 40% 5 2% 98% 49 
 
 
Table 8: Starting positions (Pre-Debate) for politicians and citizens 
  Citizen   Politician   
Question Oppose 
In 
Favour n Oppose 
In 
Favour n 
Blasphemy 21% 79% 34 22% 78% 9 
Electoral system 29% 71% 24 57% 43% 7 
Women in the home 5% 95% 41 14% 86% 14 
Marriage equality 24% 76% 45 0% 100% 6 
Voting age 50% 50% 38 29% 71% 17 
Emigrant Vote 24% 76% 38 0% 100% 7 
Women in politics 13% 87% 39 0% 100% 15 
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Table 9: Factors determining support for, or opposition to, constitutional change 
    Model 1       Model 2       Model 3     
 Variable Estimate Std. 
Error 
P-Value 
 
Estimate Std. 
Error 
P-Value 
 
Estimate Std. 
Error 
P-Value 
 
                          
Intercept 0.732 0.022 <0.001 *** 1.022 0.117 <0.001 *** 0.918 0.099 <0.001 *** 
Politician 0.081 0.045 0.07 . 0.094 0.045 0.038 * 0.159 0.113 0.161 
 
Gender: Male 
    
-0.077 0.038 0.044 * -0.071 0.036 0.051 . 
Gender: Unknown 
    
-0.069 0.161 0.67 
 
-0.005 0.156 0.976 
 
Age Group: 25-34 
    
-0.16 0.11 0.146 
 
-0.157 0.107 0.145 
 
Age Group: 35-44 
    
-0.198 0.095 0.038 * -0.190 0.093 0.041 * 
Age Group: 45-54 
    
-0.036 0.092 0.696 
 
-0.038 0.089 0.674 
 
Age Group: 55-64 
    
-0.107 0.091 0.241 
 
-0.092 0.088 0.297 
 
Age Group: 65+ 
    
-0.052 0.098 0.594 
 
-0.039 0.095 0.678 
 
Age Group: Unknown 
    
-0.222 0.231 0.337 
 
-0.354 0.222 0.112 
 
Q: Electoral system 
    
-0.133 0.069 0.056 . -0.063 0.079 0.431 
 
Q: Emigrant vote 
    
-0.067 0.069 0.33 
 
-0.068 0.080 0.395 
 
Q: President term 
    
-0.375 0.069 0.000 *** -0.313 0.079 0.000 *** 
Q: Marriage equality 
    
0.061 0.069 0.38 
 
0.083 0.080 0.301 
 
Q: Voting age 
    
-0.326 0.069 0.000 *** -0.386 0.080 0.000 *** 
Q: Women in the home 
    
0.125 0.069 0.072 . 0.146 0.079 0.067 . 
Q: Women in politics 
    
0.108 0.069 0.12 
 
0.125 0.080 0.117 
 
Politician*Electoral system 
       
-0.303 0.163 0.064 . 
Politician*Emigrant vote 
       
0.005 0.159 0.973  
Politician*President term 
       
-0.250 0.159 0.116  
Politician*Marriage equality 
      
-0.083 0.159 0.603  
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Politician*Voting age 
       
0.252 0.161 0.119  
Politician*Women in the home 
       
-0.080 0.161 0.618  
Politician*Women in politics 
      
-0.064 0.161 0.690  
Variables are labelled with the following significance codes: (***) significant at the 0.001 level, (**) significant at the 0.01 level, (*) significant at the 0.05 
level, (.) somewhat significant at the 0.1 level   
N=503 (respondent-questions) 
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Figure 1: Marginal effects plot of the interaction between type of member and 
topic 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This is taken from regression model 3 in Table 9 
